Introduction
Output Perturbation is one of several strategies in the area of Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC), also known as Private Data Analysis. The general problem in SDC consists of releasing valuable information about individuals in a databasewhile preserving their privacy. Examples of this include databases containing health information about patients, customer electronic transactions, and web browsing history, among others.
These are situations in which a database is made up of records associated with individuals-each record describing attributes of the corresponding individual. In addition, these attributes provide highly valuable information from a statistical point of view, either for commercial purposes or government/private decision-making. However, each individual record contains sensitive information that cannot be publicly released. So instead of releasing the true data, a curator with access to it has to create and release a related piece of information, the sanitized data, satisfying utility and privacy requirements.
In the non-interactive setting, the curator uses the original data only once to compute the sanitized data, which is then published. In the interactive setting, users who aim to get information about the original data, can send queries to the curator, who will respond to them in a way that does not disclose private information, but is useful in some sense [10] .
In the interactive query-response model there are further subdivisions, such as: whether queries are all submitted at once and then replied (non-adaptive) or are allowed to depend on previous answers (adaptive) [6] ; and whether the curator provides privacy by modifying the queries or their true answers [8] .
Other strategies focusing on utility aspects attempt to convey utility by creating and releasing fully synthetic data satisfying certain conditions related to its usefulness [24] , while the privacy requirement is assumed to be satisfied due to the artificial nature of the data. In [23] the author expresses this as: This can protect confidentiality, since identification of units and their sensitive data can be difficult when the released data are not actual, collected values.
In the strategy of non-adaptive output perturbation studied here, the rigorous treatment and results apply to privacy aspects. Utility is somehow determined by the variable that is meant to provide privacy, the amount of perturbation applied to the true answers to the queries. Higher perturbation means more protection of privacy and less utility preserved (and vice versa).
In SDC, positive and impossibility results coexist; on one hand there is an interest in developing sanitizers that provide privacy, on the other hand we want to create adversaries showing the limitations to achieve that. Our work is built upon an impossibility result developed by Dinur and Nissim [6] , showing that the output perturbation sanitizer with perturbation o( √ n) fails to provide privacy. They do this by defining an adversary algorithm that makes O(n log 2 n) random queries to the curator of any database with one attribute and n records, and with the corresponding answers this adversary constructs (with high probability of success) a good approximation of the database.
We revisit their results and more explicitly explain the interplay of the parameters involved in the problem through an inequality that represents the trade-offs among them. Our solution, following Dinur and Nissim's approach, is given in a general context that includes databases with binary values, using a counting metric to measure the adversary's error-case of study in [6] -and databases with bounded real-values, which can be assumed to be in the interval [0, 1] , where other appropriate metrics are used.
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The origin of our results is our new version of a result in [6] called Disqualifying Lemma, whose proof is based on Azuma's Lemma, and is used as a "probability tool". We instead give a proof based on a generalization of the Central Limit Theorem, the Berry-Esseen Theorem [5] .
We also show that in the binary case the adversary is more efficient than what was claimed in [6] . However, other works [12, 14] improve [6] using different techniques, obtaining adversary attacks more efficient (see Related work) than the one we study here. The goal of this paper is to give a new presentation with rigorous mathematical proofs of the impossibility results in [6] , and to do so in a way that explicitly includes the case of real-valued databases.
Related work
Different works on SDC from the early 1970s dealt with the privacy breaches that could have been caused by the information released by statistical offices [4, 16] . Since then, due to advances in communications, the progressively available data in digital media, and the large amount of databases reachable through the Internet, questions regarding the privacy of individuals increasingly captured the attention of statisticians [7, 26] and computer scientists [2, 15] , among others.
A widely cited work in recent years is a paper by Dinur and Nissim [6] , whose main result is a polynomial-time algorithm M that reconstructs-with low error and high probability of success-a database from the perturbed replies to queries to such a database. This attack has time complexity determined by O(n log 2 n) number of queries, can defeat sanitizers with perturbation up to o( √ n), and is applicable to binary databases with one attribute. The success of this attack represents a breach of privacy, an impossibility result regarding the preservation of privacy throughout perturbation o( √ n).
This was followed by the study of further constrains on the complexity of the adversary algorithm, which may allow the existence of privacy-provider sanitizers. This is resolved positively in [6] by establishing a sanitizer applying perturbation T (n), that cannot be defeated by attackers of certain form (the attackers must be modelled in order to prove statements about them) having time complexity bounded by T (n).
Posterior works have generalized this positive result in the case of multiple-attribute databases [13] , and in a more general concept of query [3] . Further generalizations have given place to concepts such as differential privacy [8, 9, 10, 19] , sensitivity, and noise calibration [11, 20] .
There have also been improvements in the impossibility results. A follow up work of [6] , with attacks more efficient than the one studied here, is [14] . Dwork and Yekhanin introduce a deterministic attack based on a sub-quadratic algorithm that computes the Hadamard Transformation. This adversary algorithm requires only O(n log n) steps to reconstruct the database with o(n) error, making (non-random) "subset-sum" queries to a sanitizer applying o( √ n) perturbation. The setting is binary-valued databases with one attribute.
In another work [12] , new results on LP decoding are given, allowing successful attacks on output perturbation sanitizers, that are more efficient than the one described in this article. The adversary submits O(n) queries, but instead of asking the value of i∈q d i for a random q ⊆ [n] (which is the same as a, d for a = supp(q)), the adversary asks the value of a, d , where a is a random vector with independent N (0, 1) entries. If ρ < ρ * ≈ 0.239 and a ρ-fraction of the queries have perturbation at most α (with the rest having arbitrary perturbation), then with negligible probability the adversary fails to learn a proportion greater than c ρ α 2 /n of the coordinates of the binary database d. When α ∈ o( √ n), this means that with overwhelming probability the adversary learns Ω(n) of the coordinates of d. A similar result with a corresponding smaller ρ * ±1
is obtained for a ∈ {±1} n uniformly at random. The LP decoding theorems in [12] can be used to extend the adversary attack to real-valued databases. Although we do not make that analysis here, these extensions of [12] to real-valued databases should be more efficient than our results, whose main contribution is to provide an alternative and more general proof and to present the result explicitly for real-valued databases.
More recent extensions and generalizations of [6] can be found in [17] and [18] , although the privacy definitions used are different than the one considered here and in [6] . In [17] , databases are real-valued and queries are given by linear functions F : R n → R d with coefficients in [−1, 1], and Hardt and Talwar study how much error any differentially private mechanism must add, while [18] considers minimal privacy and differential privacy.
This work
Our work focuses on the attacker algorithm M described in [6] . We find a property involving the function dist used to measure the error of the output of M with respect to the true database, which is sufficiently strong to prove the success of M .
This property is sufficiently general to include the real-valued case (and the binary case in [6] ) with different alternatives for dist, such as the metrics induced by the l 1 and l 2 norms, and a function that counts the number of coordinates that differ by at least a certain threshold.
The results are proved in this general context, the key being the following inequality, where ∆ n dist denotes the maximum possible error of M with respect to dist (in the binary case this is equal to n), M A d is the attacker algorithm that uses as an oracle a queryresponse sanitizer A accessing the database d of size n, t(n) is the number of calls to A, and τ is the perturbation of A:
where α , β are explicit functions of .
The inequality-which bounds the probability of the adversary having at least relative error-relates all the parameters of the problem and can be used to specialize some of them and see how the others are determined. For example, if the perturbation τ is O(n 1/3 ), then it turns out that certain t(n) ∈ O(n) are good enough to make the attacker M successful, i.e., make the right side of the inequality negligible on n. Likewise, if the perturbation is o( √ n), then certain t ∈ o(n log n) suffice to make M successful.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we provide the definitions used later, all of which (except Definition 4) were established in [6] . In Section 3 we review the attacker algorithm presented in [6] . Then we review different functions that can be used to measure the adversary error in the real-valued case (with essentially the same adversary algorithm from [6] ). After that we establish a property about the error-measure function dist (which could be a metric or not) and we show that our cases of interest satisfy this property. In Section 4 we prove the impossibility results based only on this common property and our version of the Disqualifying Lemma, whose proof is given in detail in the Appendix (Section 6).
Section 5 contains some final remarks.
Preliminaries
The databases considered in this work describe a single real-valued variable, an attribute, about n different individuals. For simplicity assume that the range of this attribute is [0, 1], but notice that all the results established can as well be given for any
A database is accessed by users through queries sent to a curator of the database, who in turn replies to the queries using a sanitizer responsible for protecting the privacy of the individuals whose data is in the database. In this model, a query is determined by a subset of [n], and its answer is the sum of the corresponding values of the database.
To preserve the privacy of the individuals, the curator uses the sanitizer to release a perturbation of the true answer instead of the true answer. The only restriction given to the sanitizer is that the difference between the true answer of a query and its reply is bounded from above by a publicly known value.
An adversary or attacker is an individual who tries to obtain a good approximation of the values of the database, based on the replies of some queries sent to the curator.
, and its true answer is i∈q d i .
Definition 3. An adversary is an algorithm M with input 1 n , for any n ∈ N. If the input is 1 n (for a particular n) then M can use, as an oracle, a certain function O : {q|q ⊆ [n]} → R. M is also allowed to use random choices from {0, 1} to produce an output.
One need not explicitly define O in Definition 3. Only when we want to state specific results will we say what O is.
The approximation is evaluated using a function dist taking non-negative real-values and having both d and M A d (1 n ) as an argument. We can think dist as a metric, although we also consider a case in which the function "measures" proximity (the closer to zero the better the approximation), but is not an actual metric.
Each call of M to O contributes one unit of time towards the computational complexity of M . The reason for considering 1 n as the input of M (instead of n) is that otherwise M would not have polynomial-time complexity, simply because creating a query of size n 2 (the expected size of a random subset q ⊆ [n] is n 2 ) would require an exponential number of steps with respect to the size of the input.
We want query-response sanitizers to confront adversaries, so these mechanisms have to be compatible. So far, each sanitizer depends on a particular d ∈ [0, 1] n (for a fixed n ∈ N), while each adversary works for any n ∈ N. Let D n be the set of possible databases of size n, i.e.,
This work is about the fact that given an assembled sanitizer with a certain perturbation, it is possible to describe an adversary and conditions on the relevant parameters of the problem so that the adversary causes a privacy breach in a sense defined below.
Since both d and M
n , the maximum error that the adversary can make is ∆ n dist = max x,y∈[0,1] n dist(x, y), i.e., the diameter of [0, 1] n with respect to dist. An assembled sanitizer is considered to cause a breach of privacy if there is an efficient adversary algorithm that reconstructs the values of any database with low error and high probability by using only the assembled sanitizer as an oracle. Recall that a function f : N → R ≥0 is negligible if:
Definition 5. An assembled sanitizer A causes an -privacy-breach if there exists a polynomial-time adversary M and a negligible function p :
where the probability is taken with respect to the randomness in the adversary algorithm.
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The model described has five relevant parameters: (1) the dimension n of the database d; (2) the adversary relative error ∈ (0, 1); (3) the perturbation τ of the query-response sanitizer; (4) the complexity of the adversary algorithm (which depends on the number of queries it makes); and (5) the probability of failure (or success) of the adversary.
Our goal is to understand how these parameters interact and find conditions on them that guarantee a privacy breach. Statements such as the following are the ones we are interested in: for any given > 0 and any given τ ∈ o( √ n), if A is an assembled sanitizer with perturbation τ , then there exists a polynomial-time adversary M and an n 0 such that if n ≥ n 0 then ∀d ∈ D n ,
In other words, for any > 0, every assembled sanitizer whose perturbation is in o( √ n) causes an -privacy-breach.
Specifying the dist function
In this section we consider two possible scopes for the database d. The first one is the binary case, with databases taking values in {0, 1} n and dist given by the metric counting the number of coordinates in which two vectors differ.
In the other case databases are real-valued, and three different dist functions are analyzed. Two of them are the metrics induced by the l 1 and l 2 norms, while the third one is a function that, not being a metric, measures proximity by counting the number of coordinates that differ by at least a certain threshold.
Binary Databases
In [6] the databases are d ∈ {0, 1} n , and they are compared with the adversary's guess through dist(x, y) = |{i ∈ [n] : x i = y i }|, which can be at most ∆ n dist = max x,y∈{0,1} n dist(x, y) = n.
The following is the algorithm exhibited in [6] . It depends on the parameter t = t(n), referred to as number of queries. As we will state in Remark 2, the number of queries is closely related to, and determines, the time complexity of the algorithm. We treat t(n) as an integer, so if it is not, assume it denotes t(n) . Algorithm M ; input 1 n with n ∈ N; output c ; access to oracle O.
(1) Choose t(n) subsets of [n], independently and unif. at random, q 1 , ..., q t(n) .
(2) Solve the LP: find c We assume that O is associated with a publicly known perturbation τ , because we are not concerned about M being useful otherwise. We want M to be effective approximating d when O = A d , and it has a publicly known perturbation τ with respect to d. In that case the LP in (2) has at least one solution, c = d. To obtain a random query in (2) the adversary flips a fair coin for each element of [n].
Real-valued Databases
For real-valued databases d ∈ [0, 1] n consider the same adversary algorithm, except that the output does not have to be rounded to a binary vector. Algorithm M ; input 1 n with n ∈ N; output c; access to oracle O.
(2) Solve the LP: find c
Consider three different dist functions:
dist(x, y) = ||x − y|| 1 , where
Although dist γ is not a metric since it does not satisfy the triangle inequality (or the fact that it is 0 only when x = y), it seems a reasonable way to measure how well the guess made by the adversary approximates the database. Restricted to {0, 1} n , dist γ becomes the dist function used in the binary case.
A common property
We introduce some notation. For n ∈ N, let K n = {0,
n , denote byx the point in K n n such that eachx j is the closest point in K n to the corresponding x j (if there are two choices take the smallest). Similarly, x is the point in D n such that each x j is the closest to x j . Although for the real-valued case this is trivial since x = x, it is convenient to keep the notation. The property we are interested in is the following:
Note that the previous implication is equivalent to Now we verify that (3.1) holds in both the binary and real-valued cases.
n, meaning that (3.1) holds for n = 3, ρ = Real-valued; ||.|| 1 
n, so to make (3.1) true suffices n = 
Results
To prove the results we are interested in, we use the following lemma, whose proof is given in the Appendix. In particular, this lemma implies the Disquali-fying Lemma in [6] . To abbreviate, denote I , then ∀τ > 0, ∀y ∈ I n ρ ,
where the probability is taken with respect to a random q ⊆ [n], obtained by n independent tosses of a fair coin to determine, for each j ∈ [n], if j ∈ q.
Corollary 7. (Disqualifying Lemma [6] .) Let ∈ (0, 1), let τ ∈ o( √ n), and take, for each n, any two points
Then there exists δ > 0, independent of n, such that for n sufficiently large (depending on and τ ),
where the probability is taken as in Lemma 6.
Proof. It is enough to show P i∈q
So by Lemma 6, it suffices to show
, there is n 0 (depending on and τ ) such that if n ≥ n 0 then
Assuming that property (3.1) is true, given any ∈ (0, 1), let ρ and n be the corresponding values from (3.1). Then define for each n ≥ n and
n , x ∈ D n denotes the closest point to x in D n (with respect to ||.|| ∞ ), we can easily unify the two descriptions of the adversary algorithm M into one that applies to both cases. In step (3) of M just say that the output is c , where c is the solution of LP. In the binary case this leaves M unchanged, while in the real-valued case this adds a trivial step at the end. Now we can prove the results for both cases at once.
In the following propositions, the probability is taken over the random choices q 1 , ..., q t(n) made by M . Lemma 8. Assume (3.1) and let A be an assembled sanitizer with perturbation τ . Then
(1) Follows from property (3.1).
(2) Put x =ĉ. Since c solves LP and A has perturbation τ , then ∀j ∈ [t(n)],
n , and the t(n) subsets q j are chosen independently, turning the probability of "∀j ∈ [t(n)]" into a product of probabilities.
A similar result is stated in [6] , after which the Disqualifying Lemma is applied, leading to the inequality
. Since the goal is to cause a privacy breach with M , meaning that the right hand side of the inequality is negligible with respect to n, it is enough to put t(n) = n log 2 n.
Analogously, we combine Lemma 8 with Lemma 6. Since the latter is a stronger version of the Disqualifying Lemma, we can make the corresponding probability negligible with a lower value of t(n). . Then
Now, α and β were chosen to make λ ρ + µ ρ · (2τ (n) + 1) = α + β · τ (n), so:
and the result follows from Lemma 8.
Remark 1. In the general setting, when we only rely on (3.1), we cannot specify n and ρ any better, but we can in each particular case. In the binary case (see analysis at the end of Section 3) Lemma 9 holds ∀n ≥ n = 3 and ρ = Corollary 10. Assume (3.1) and let A be an assembled sanitizer with perturbation
for certain t ∈ o(n log n).
Proof. If n ≥ n , then by Corollary 9 it suffices that (n + 1)
. Since τ ∈ o( √ n), there exists n 1 depending on and τ such that ∀n ≥ n 1 , log 2 ( √ n/(α + β · τ (n))) > 0. So put n 0 = max(n , n 1 ) and t(n) = n(1+log 2 (n+1)) log 2 ( √ n/(α +β ·τ (n)))
, which is in o(n log n) since the denominator tends to infinity as n → ∞.
Corollary 9 describes the interplay among the relevant parameters of the model. Corollary 10 is an example of how those parameters can be adjusted according to given restrictions. For instance, if we want τ independent of , then decreasing (the accuracy of the adversary) makes t larger, increasing its time-complexity (as can be seen in the proof since 0 makes α , β ∞, roughly). 3 Another example is that if τ ∈ O(n 1/3 ) then t can be take in O(n).
Although the function t in the previous proof is in o(n log n), t actually depends on , and as 0 we have n 0 ∞. This is not a problem since from a practical point of view, would be chosen appropriately and kept fixed.
Remark 2. If t(n) is bounded by a polynomial, then the adversary algorithm M is polynomial. When M receives the input 1 n , it creates t(n) random subsets, which requires n · t(n) operations. Then it makes the corresponding t(n) calls to the oracle and finally solves an LP of size n · t(n), for which there exists an algorithm finding a solution in poly(n · t(n)) [25] . So if t(n) is polynomial on n, the number of steps made by M is polynomial on n, the size of the input.
Theorem 11. Assume (3.1), let > 0 and τ ∈ o( √ n)). Then, any assembled sanitizer with perturbation τ causes an -privacy-breach.
Proof. From Corollary 10, for any such assembled sanitizer A, there is a polynomial q of degree 2 (with constants depending on ) and an adversary M such that ∀n, t(n) ≤ q (n), and ∃n 0 (depending on ) such that ∀n
M is a polynomial-time algorithm by Remark 2, and the function given by f (n) = 2 −n if n ≥ n 0 and f (n) = 1 otherwise, is negligible with respect to n.
Concluding remarks
Dinur-Nissim proof of the Disqualifying Lemma. Our work follows the strategy of Dinur and Nissim [6] . Whereas [6] proves the Disqualifying Lemma using martingales and Azuma's inequality, we use the Berry-Esseen Theorem, which allows to obtain results for real-values databases as well. It may be possible to extend the (martingale) analysis of Dinur-Nissim to real-valued databases, however, our intention (and partly the motivation of this work) was to avoid Dinur-Nissim's proof of the Disqualifying Lemma, due to an incompatibility between two conditions needed on a constant T (see proof in the Appendix of [6] ).
In the proof it is required that 1 − 2e
, and therefore T ≤
, which is incompatible with T > 2.
n , our results apply to any D n ⊆ [0, 1] n provided that: (i) for each x we have well defined x ∈ D n as the "best approximation" of x (whatever that means); (ii) the criteria for such an approximation is the same used to create c in the last step of M ; (iii) property (3.1) holds for the chosen criteria x → x and the dist function used. Cases other than D n = {0, 1} n and D n = [0, 1] n may be considered if the attacker has auxiliary information about d which induces a convenient choice for D n .
Multiple attributes. It would be interesting to extend the attack to a database with many attributes. It seems possible to use the same attack on each column of a database of size n×m, but it would be interesting to assume some dependency/correlation among the attributes (considered as random variables), and make the adversary algorithm exploit this fact.
In the one dimensional case, the adversary algorithm uses the true database d as certain property publicly known, namely, that all query responses have error bounded by τ . This property is imposed over certain queries q 1 , ..., q t to the c that induces the output c . In this way c and d become related by the property ∀j ∈ [t] : | i∈qj (c i − d i )| ≤ 2τ + 1 . The question is how to relate this property with an upper bound on ||c − d|| 2 . This is done with Lemma 6: if over a random query q, P [| i∈q
And since by construction of c it is true that for each q j all such sums are ≤ 2τ + 1, then the probability considered in the hypothesis of Lemma 6 is high, making large the probability of ||c − d|| 2 being small. Thus, the attack is based on the fact that d has a property that is publicly known, allowing the attacker to efficiently create a good candidate. If now d has many attributes, then it may be possible to find out an extra and verifiable property that d has due to the high dimension and make the adversary exploit it to create its output. Then it could happen that the new relationship between c and d becomes more restrictive, making ||c − d|| 2 even smaller.
Utility. Theorem 11 establishes the limitation of the output perturbation sanitizer in producing privacy-protected sanitized data, when the perturbation is o( √ n). This means that to provide privacy by this method, the perturbation must be higher than o( √ n). It would be interesting to have a rigorous result establishing the relationship between the utility of perturbed data and the level of perturbation, and eventually show that sanitized data that has been perturbed more than o( √ n) is significantly useless.
Appendix
To prove Lemma 6 we use a generalization of the Central Limit Theorem called BerryEsseen Theorem (BET). See [22] for a proof of this result, or [5] (Chap. 11) for more references. See [21] for a proof of the fact that A can be chosen as A = 32.
Lemma 6. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1), let n ∈ N, and I , then ∀τ > 0, ∀y ∈ I n ρ ,
where the probability is taken with respect to a random q ⊆ [n] obtained by n independent tosses of a fair coin to determine for each j ∈ [n], if j ∈ q.
Proof. Fix ρ ∈ (0, 1), n ∈ N, y ∈ I . Then:
Since sup x |F n (x) − Φ(x)| ≤ A · Γ n , we get:
and: | lim Adding and subtracting terms appropriately, equations (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4) give: where A ≤ 32 is given by BET. First we bound the integral. Since φ(t) = Next, bound Γ n :
From equations (6.5), (6.6), (6.7) follows:
